Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 13
Issue 4 Issue 4 - October 1960

Article 21

10-1960

Personal Property and Sales -- 1960 Tennessee Survey
Gilbert S. Merrit, Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Gilbert S. Merrit, Jr., Personal Property and Sales -- 1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 Vanderbilt Law Review
1189 (1960)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/21

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

PERSONAL PROPERTY AND SALES-1960 TENNESSEE SURVEY
GILBERT S. MERRITT, JR.*
I. PERSONAL PROPERTY

A. Bailments
1, Innkeeper's Liability for Damage to Guest's Auto
2. Bailee'g Liability for Negligence

II. SALES

A. ConditionalSales

1. Waiver of Public Sale of Repossessed Goods

2. Seizure of Vehicles Illegally TransportingLiquor
*

*

*

A foreigner given to rash generalizations would quickly conclude
upon reading this year's sales and personal property cases that the
three most flourishing and litigation-producing institutions in Tennessee are the automobile, the General Motors Acceptance Corporation and bootlegging. The automobile is responsible for all five of the
cases covered in this survey; in four of the five the General Motors
Acceptance Corporation is the defendant; and two of the five grow
out of bootlegging activities.
I.

PERSONAL PROPERTY

A. Bailments
1. Innkeeper's Liability for Damage to Guest's Auto.-The difficult
question of the innkeeper's liability for damage to his guest's personal
property came before the Eastern Section of the Tennessee Court of
Appeals during the survey period. In Sewell v. Mountain View Hotel'
the court had to decide whether a guest, who parks his automobile in
an open, unattended parking area provided by the hotel free of
charge, can recover from the hotel for damage to the auto caused by
the negligent driving of a motorist who had no connection with the
hotel. The guest parked and locked his car on a lot adjacent to the
hotel after seeing a sign indicating that the lot was for the use of
guests; and the car was damaged when a drunk driver, neither a
guest nor an employee of the hotel, lost control of his automobile and
careened into the parking area. The plaintiff conceded that the hotel
had not been negligent and relied instead on the common-law theory
that an innkeeper is strictly liable for damage to his guest's personalty. Affirming the trial court's directed verdict in favor of the hotel,
the court of appeals held the theory of strict liability inapplicable
* Assistant to the Dean and Instructor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School;

member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 325 S.W.2d 626 (E.S. Tenn. 1959).
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since the hotel, unaware that the guest had parked his car in its lot,
had neither accepted control of the car nor directed that it be parked
in the lot.
Tennessee follows the ancient common-law doctrine that an innkeeper is an insurer of goods entrusted to his care.2 Where the guest
brings property into the hotel, it is established that such liability extends not only to goods placed in the custody of the innkeeper but
also includes property which the guest keeps in his possession in the
hotel.3 Innkeepers have also been held strictly responsible for property such as horses and automobiles placed in their custody,4 but the
Mountain View Hotel case refuses to allow recovery for damage to
vehicles parked in a specified area at the invitation of the hotel when
possession and control are retained by the guest.
The extent of the innkeeper's duty to protect his guests' automobiles
from damage is not clearly settled. Courts, in many cases reluctant to
hold hotel garage facilities strictly liable, have found it difficult to
give a satisfactory explanation for their results.5 And the court here
found difficulty in providing adequate theoretical underpinning for
what seems to be a proper result. Even though the hotel had installed
a sign inviting guests to use its parking area, the court states the conclusion that there is no liability since possession and control of the
automobile remained with the guest, and no attempt is made to distinguish cases holding innkeepers strictly liable for goods which are
brought into the inn by the guest and retained in his exclusive control.
Some language in the opinion suggests that the court is merely applying what it conceives to be a common-law rule: "whenever the guest
retains the custody and control of his property ... the innkeeper...
is not responsible for the acts of third persons with whom he is in
no way connected. '6 This is not, however, an accurate statement of
2. David Karp Co. v. Read House, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Tenn. 1954);

Manning v. Wells, 28 Tenn. 746 (1849); Andrew Jackson Hotel v. Platt, 19
Tenn. App. 360, 89 S.W.2d 179 (M.S. 1936). See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY §§
102, 105 (2d ed. 1955). There are two statutory exceptions to this rule: TENN.
CODE ANN. § 62-703 (1956) (immunity from liability if hotel provides safe for
valuables); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-705 (1956) (immunity from liability if
hotel provides checkroom for baggage).
3. Manning v. Wells, 28 Tenn. 746 (1849) (dicta); BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY

§§ 102, 105 (2d ed. 1955).

4. Dickerson v. Rogers, 23 Tenn. 179 (1843) (innkeeper liable for horse
injured while in his stable). See Andrew Jackson Hotel v. Platt, 19 Tenn.
App. 360, 89 S.W.2d 179 (M.S. 1936); BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 105 (2d ed.
1955).
5. See, e.g., George v. Williams, 5 D.L.R.2d 21 (1956) (Ontario Ct. App.),
discussed in Murray, Innkeeper-Liability for Loss of Goods Left in Car of
Guest, 34 CAN. BAR REV. 1203 (1956).
6. The complete statement is: "[W]henever the guest retains custody and
control of his property in such a way as to indicate that he is not trusting
the innkeeper to guard and protect it and concedes to the innkeeper no control
or right of control, the property of the guest is not impliedly in the custody
of the innkeeper and he is not responsible for the acts of third persons with
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the rule for it does not take into account the cases in which innkeepers
are held strictly liable for damage or theft of go6ds such as clothing
7
and baggage over which the guest retains complete possession.
Innkeepers who provide garage facilities or parking space for their
guests should be liable, it seems, only for negligence; and it is believed
that the court should have settled Tennessee law in favor of such a
rule. Commercial garages and parking lots are liable for negligence
only,8 and no cogent reason appears for placing a higher standard of
care on hotel-kept parking lots. By statute Great Britain recently
clarified this area of the law by excepting hotel parking facilities
from strict liability while retaining the common-law doctrine elsewhere.9

The instant case suggests another interesting problem, one that has
not been raised in Tennessee or other states: namely, the liability of
motels for damage to the automobiles of their guests. This case may
be precedent for the proposition that motel proprietors will not ordinarily be held strictly responsible for damage to a guest's auto since
guests normally retain complete control of their cars while staying
at the motel.
2. Bailee's Liability for Negligence.-While the courts decided no
other cases during the survey period dealing with the substantive law
of bailments, the Tennessee Supreme Court rendered a decision interpreting a Tennessee statute which presumes negligence on the part of
a bailee who fails to redeliver the bailed goods according to the bailment contract or redelivers them in a damaged condition. For a discussion of this case, see the surveys of torts and procedure. 10
whom he is in no way connected." 325 S.W.2d at 628. (Emphasis added.)
The italicized language, which was omitted from the quotation in the text,
suggests that the court may be taking the view that the plaintiff by locking
his car in the unattended lot assumed the risk of damage by a stranger; but
the court treated the issue as a question of law, whereas "assumption of the
risk" is usually treated as a question of fact for the jury. See BROWN, PERSONAL
PROPERTY 487 (2d ed. 1955); PROSSER, TORTS 343 (2d ed. 1955).
7. See

BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY §§

102, 105 (2d ed. 1955).

8. Dickson v. Blacker, 194 Tenn. 504, 253 S.W.2d 728 (1952); Andrew Jackson
Hotel v. Platt, 19 Tenn. App. 360, 89 S.W.2d 179 (M.S. 1936); Malone v. Harth,
12 Tenn. App. 687 (E.S. 1930).
9. Hotel Proprietors Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 62, based on the Second

Report of the Law Reform Committee on the Law of Innkeepers' Liability

for Property of Travellers, Guests and Residents. For a discussion of the act,
see Blom-Cooper, Legislation, 20 MOD. L. REv. 153 (1957). Several U. S. cases
have held without the aid of a statute that hotel-kept garages are liable for
negligence only. See, e.g., Hallman v. Federal Parking Serv., Inc., 134 A.2d

382 (D.C. Mun. App. 1957); Weisman v. Holley Hotel Co., 128 W. Va. 476,
37 S.E.2d 94 (1946) (semble).

10. See Morgan, Procedure & Evidence-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAMN.

L. REV. 1197, 1221 (1960); Wade, Torts-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND. L.
REV. 1269, 1279 (1960).
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II. SALES
A. ConditionalSales
1. Waiver of Public Sale of Repossessed Goods.-Two recent cases
interpret provisions of the Tennessee Conditional Sales Act prescribing the requirements for a valid waiver of compulsory public sale.
Section 47-1302 of the code provides that the conditional seller, after
retaking the goods upon default by the buyer, is obliged to resell
them, satisfying the amount of his claim from the proceeds and paying the excess, if any, over to the buyer. This sale must be public
rather than private unless "the original seller, or his assignee, and
the purchaser ...by agreement in writing, entered into after default,
waive the [public] sale provided for in this section."" Section
47-1306 then provides that unless there is a valid waiver of public
sale under section 47-1302 "the original purchaser may recover from
said seller or assignee that part of the consideration paid to him" if
he fails to resell the goods at public auction. 12
In Douglas v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,13 the defaulting
purchaser of an automobile brought suit under section 47-1306 against
the assignee of the conditional sales contract for installments paid
under the contract, claiming that the assignee sold the repossessed
auto at private rather than public sale without receiving a valid
waiver of public auction under section 47-1302. The plaintiff admitted
writing a letter waiving the requirement of public auction and
authorizing the defendant to sell the car by private sale. But he
claimed that the waiver lacked consideration and was therefore
invalid.
The question facing the supreme court was whether the word
"waive" as used in section 47-1302 ("but ... the purchaser ... may
... waive the [public] sale") is to be given its common-law meaning
which requires that in order to have a valid waiver of a legal obligation there must be either a contract supported by consideration or the
element of estoppel-though there are many exceptions to this rule.14
While the court did not discuss the issue in terms of statutory construction, it apparently assumed that the legislature did not use
the word "waive" in the sense of "elect" or "dispense with" but
rather in its common-law sense as denoting a promise to surrender a
right supported by consideration or estoppel. 15 Having made this
assumption, the supreme court then affirmed the court of appeal's
11. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1302 (1956).
12. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 47-1306 (1956).

13. 326 S.W.2d 846 (Tenn. 1959).
14. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 679 (rev. ed. 1936).
15. See generally SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 5301-03 (3d ed.
Horack 1943).
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decision for the defendant by holding the plaintiff's waiver of public
sale effective because both consideration and circumstances raising
a promissory estoppel were present. To find consideration, the opinion relied on a statute creating a presumption of consideration in the
absence of proof to the contrary. The court also reasoned that plaintiff
is estopped to deny the validity of the waiver since the defendant
sold the auto at private sale acting in reliance on plaintiff's letter
expressly permitting such a sale.
Though the court was deterred by an earlier Tennessee decision
requiring consideration for the waiver of public sale, a much shorter
and more intellectually satisfying path to this result is to say simply
that the legislature did not intend by its use of the word "waive" to
embody all of the word's common-law nuances. "Waive" is a word of
everyday speech and does not necessarily mean the relinquishment of
a right in exchange for a valid consideration.
In Tedesco v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,16 the facts were
practically the same as those of the Douglas case above except that
when plaintiff surrendered the auto to defendant he signed a contract
whereby he was given until a specified date to redeem the auto by
paying the delinquent installments. In the redemption contract,
plaintiff also waived the statutory requirement of public sale if the
delinquencies were not paid. The auto was sold at private sale according to the agreement when the delinquencies were not paid. The
plaintiff could hardly contend that the contract lacked consideration,
as did the plaintiff in the Douglas case; instead he argued that the
waiver was invalid because the waiver agreement was not "entered
into after default" according to the terms of section 47-1302. He
contended that repossession under such a redemption agreement is
not a "default" within the meaning of section 47-1302 but in effect
extends the time for payment, vitiating the "default." The Court of
Appeals for the Western Section, relying heavily on one of its prior
unreported cases, accepted plaintiff's argument and reversed the
trial court's decision in favor of the defendant.
The court reasoned that the purpose of the statute disallowing
waivers entered into before "default" is to prevent conditional sellers
from inducing a delinquent purchaser to consent to forego a public
sale in exchange for such consideration as the opportunity to redeem.
The purchaser's decision to forego a public auction should be voluntary and not induced by "bait" dangled before him on a string. Such
reasoning is in direct conflict with the requirement of the Douglas
case that the waiver be supported by consideration. Consideration is
usually nothing more than "bait," the exchange of something of value
16. 326 S.W.2d 837 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958).
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for something else of value. The supreme court in Douglas said that
a waiver is invalid if not supported by consideration while the court
of appeals in Tedesco reasoned that the waiver is premature and
invalid if some kind of consideration is given to induce the waiver.
It is difficult to believe that the legislature, in passing the Conditional
Sales Act, intended such a contradiction; yet the supreme court's
opinion in the Douglas case contains language which apparently
17
approves the court of appeals decision in Tedesco.
As the supreme court aptly observed in the Douglas opinion, private
sales through commercial channels usually result in higher realization
on collateral for the benefit of all parties than do public sales:
Forty years ago public sales of distress property under these conditional
sales transactions had much greater efficacy than they do today. It is a
matter of common knowledge among the legal profession, as well as a
great many business people, that so many of these notices required by
the statute to be posted in 3 public places in the county are never seen by
anybody ....
In addition to that, experience has shown that in sales
of this kind so frequently the public sale does not bring as good a price
as a private sale ....
Therefore, a great many defaulting purchasers
prefer to sign these waivers on the belief that they will obtain a larger
price for the article, thereby reducing the balance remaining due on the
debt.18
It is hoped that private sales will be encouraged. 19 In order to
encourage such sales, it would seem that courts should not read into
the statute the requirement that a waiver of public sale be supported
by consideration. Neither are private sales encouraged by reading into
the statute language which renders invalid waivers given in exchange
for the opportunity to redeem the repossessed goods-especially since
agreements allowing this opportunity should likewise be encouraged.
2. Seizure of Vehicles Illegally Transporting Liquor.-In General
Motors Acceptance Corporationv. Atkins,20 the conditional buyer of
an automobile was caught unlawfully transporting liquor; and the
plaintiff, the Commissioner of Finance and Taxation, confiscated the
car under a statute authorizing seizure of vehicles used to transport
contraband goods.21 Defendant, the assignee of the conditional sales
contract, claimed a superior interest in the automobile on the ground
that it had satisfied the requirements of the statute. Under the
statute the commissioner's power over such confiscated vehicles is
superior to the rights of persons holding a security interest therein
17. 326 S.W.2d at 851.
18. Id. at 850.

19. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504 and the explanatory notes

thereto.

20. 325 S.W.2d 270 (Tenn. 1959).
21. TENN. CODE ANat. § 57-622 (Supp. 1959).
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unless the lienholder, prior to the acquisition of his interest in the
vehicle, investigates the owner's reputation for dealing in liquor by
making "inquiry at the headquarters of the sheriff, chief of police,
principal federal internal revenue officer engaged in the enforcement
of the liquor laws, or other principal local or federal law-enforcement
officer of the locality in which the owner resides." (Emphasis added.)
Affirming the trial court's decision restoring the auto to defendant, the
supreme court held that the defendant satisfied the requirements
of the statute when he made inquiry of the Federal Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Unit in Nashville and was informed that the owner had
no record or reputation for violation of liquor laws. Justice Tomlinson
dissented on the ground that inquiry was not made of an official in
the correct locality since the owner, a resident of Humboldt, bought
the auto in Jackson and inquiry was made in Nashville, one hundred
fifty miles away.
In Boyd v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,23 the fact situation
was similar. The supreme court held that the conditions of the
statute requiring inquiry of a local official were not met when the
assignee merely asked the automobile dealer who sold the car about
the reputation of the owner and was informed that he was not engaged
in transporting liquor illegally. The trial court's decision restoring
the auto to the defendant was reversed.
22. TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-623 (Supp. 1959).
23. 330 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. 1959).

